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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNT FILED IN OFFICE
STATE OF GEORGIA

JAN 272011
GAA NICHOLSON ADVISORS, LLC

)

DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY GA

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

)

~

Civil Action File No. 2010-CV-191111

)

CORTLAND PARTNERS, LLC,
and NICHOLSON ADVISORS, LLC

)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On January 24, 2011, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument on
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on Count I of its Complaint.

After hearing the

arguments made by counsel, and reviewing the briefs submitted on the motion and the record in
the case, the Court finds as follows:
This case involves a dispute among several interrelated entities over a 330-unit residential
development in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, known as the Indigo Park Apartments.
The Parties

GAA-Nicholson, LLC ("Property Owner") is a single purpose entity formed to acquire
and develop the Indigo Park Apartments. Defendant Nicholson Advisors, LLC ("Company")
and GAA-Nicholson Partners, LP ("Partners") are the sole members and managers of the
Property Owner.

The Company is owned by Plaintiff GAA Nicholson Advisors, LLC

("Plaintiff') and Nicholson Development Partners, LLC ("Development"), but managed by
Defendant Cortland Partners, LLC ("Manager").

1

The Parties' Connections

To fully appreciate the context of the instant dispute, it is crucial to understand the
parties' relationships to each other. Plaintiff is a member of Company, as well as the sole
general partner of Partners.

Manager manages Company and owns a 70% interest in

Development. The operating agreement of Company ("Company's Operating Agreement") and
the operating agreement of Property Owner ("Property Owner's Operating Agreement") were
both executed on September 8, 2006 and amended on February 21, 2008.

Mr. J. David

DeShong, a member and the manager of Plaintiff, executed both Company's Operating
Agreement and Property Owner's Operating Agreement. Mr. Steven J. DeFrancis, the manager
of Manager, executed both Company's Operating Agreement and Property Owner's Operating
Agreement.
The Dispute

On July 16, 2010, Partners, acting by and through its general partner, Plaintiff, initiated
the buy-sell procedure pursuant to Section 13.4 of Property Owner's Operating Agreement (the
"Buy-Sell Procedure"). The Buy-Sell Procedure provides that upon notice of any member of
Property Owner (the "Buy-Sell Movant"), the other member (the "Buy-Sell Respondent") has
the right to elect within 30 days to purchase all of the membership interest of the Buy-Sell
Movant. Otherwise, the Buy-Sell Movant will become the purchaser in the transaction, and the
Buy-Sell Respondent must sell all of its membership interest to the Buy-Sell Movant.
On August 11,2010, Company, acting by and through Manager, notified Partners that it
was invoking its right to purchase all of Partner's membership interest in Property Owner (the
"Buy-Sell Decision"). On August 17,2010, Partners, acting by and through Plaintiff, responded
to Company's notice with a letter refusing to accept the Buy-Sell Decision on the grounds that
Company does not have authority to invoke its rights under the Buy-Sell Procedure.
2

On September 20, 2010, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Company and Manager
seeking: 1) a declaration from the Court that the Buy-Sell Decision is a "Major Decision"
pursuant to Section 5.2 of Company's Operating Agreement requiring unanimous consent of all
of Company's members, 2) equitable relief to enjoin Manager from consummating the purchase
of Partner's membership interest in Property Owner, and 3) damages for Manager's alleged
breach of its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on Count I of its Complaint. In support of
its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff relies on Section 5.2 of Company's Operating
Agreement to argue that the Buy-Sell Decision constitutes a "Major Decision" which requires
the consent of Plaintiff, as well as Development.

Section 5.2 of Company's Operating

Agreement states that Manager is not authorized to take any action that is defmed as a "Major
Decision" without the unanimous consent of the members ("Major Decision").

Section 5.2

specifically identifies twenty events that constitute a "Major Decision," including the following
actions:
5.2(a) Execution of any contract with or payment of any amount to a
Member (of the Company or [Property Owner]) or any Affiliate of a Member (of
the Company or [Property Owner]) ...
5.2(g) A decision to merge or consolidate the Company or [Property
Owner] with or into another entity or to invest in or acquire an interest in any
other entity or to cause [Property Owner] to invest in or acquire an interest in any
other entity.
Plaintiff argues that the consummation of the Buy-Sell Decision would implicate both
provisions. First, the purchase by Company of Partner's membership interest would result in the
execution of a contract with a member of Property Owner, thereby triggering Section 5.2(a).
Second, by acting as the purchaser, Company would acquire an interest in Property Owner,
which Plaintiff argues is "any other entity" under Section 5.2(g).
Summary Judgment Standard
3

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56
when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that
the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary
judgment as a matter o flaw. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991).
Legal Authority

The construction of the tenns of a written contract is generally a matter of law for the
trial court. OCGA § 13-2-1; Auldridge v. Rivers, 263 Ga. App. 396, 398 (2003). The cardinal
rule of contract construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties. Mountain Aire Realty, Inc.
v. Birdie White Enterprises, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 366, 368 (2004). "If the tenns of the contract are
clear and unambiguous, the court simply enforces the contract according to its clear tenns ... if
the contract is ambiguous in some respect, the court must apply the rules of contract construction
to resolve the ambiguity."

Fix v. McAllister, 273 Ga.App. 463, 466 (2005). The Georgia

Supreme COUli has explained:
The fundamental rule, the rule which swallows up almost all others in
construing a contract, is to give it that meaning which will best carry into effect
the intent ofthe parties. This is the object ofthe rules of interpretation, to discover
the true intent of the parties, and in doing this we are to consider the language of
the parties' agreement with the surrounding circumstances. In construing
contracts, courts should look to the substantial purpose which apparently
influenced the minds 0 f the parties, rather than at the details 0 f making such
purpose effectual. Furthermore, a contract should be given a reasonable
construction that will upho Id the agreement rather than a construction that will
render the agreement meaningless and ineffective.
McLendon v. Priest, 259 Ga. 59, 60 (1989) (citations omitted).
The Court finds Plaintiffs argument that the Buy-Sell Decision is one of the actions
listed under the Major Decision provision not convincing and contrary to the intent ofthe parties.
The Buy-Sell Provision contained in Property Owner's Operating Agreement and the Major
Decision provision contained in Company's Operating Agreement were negotiated at the same
time by the same individuals, albeit while acting on behalf of different, related entities.
4

,

<

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds it hard to conceive that Plaintiff,
acting on behalf of Partners, could invoke the Buy-Sell Procedure under Property Owner's
Operating Agreement and then turn around and prevent Manager, acting on behalf of Company,
from exercising its judgment of whether to buy or sell by contending that that decision was
subject to the consent of the same party which invoked the Buy-Sell Procedure initially. To be
clear, the Court does not dispute that the Buy-Sell Decision is a major decision. But to give
effect to the underlying purpose of the Buy-Sell Procedure, it necessarily follows that the BuySell Decision cannot, at the same time, qualify as a Major Decision.
Further, had the parties actually intended that the Buy-Sell Decision would be a Major
Decision, they could have easily added the Buy-Sell Decision to the list of the twenty specific
actions included in the defmition ofa "Major Decision" under Company's Operating Agreement.
The Court is unwilling to construe Section 5.2(a) or Section 5.2(g) of the Major Decision
provision in such a manner as to render the remedy provided for under the Buy-Sell Provision
totally ineffective, particularly in view ofthe failure ofthe parties to include it specifically within
the twenty Major Decisions. See IH Riverdale, LLC v. McChesney Capital Partners, LLC, 292
Ga. App. 841, 845 (2008).
Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby
DENIED. Accordingly, as the parties conceded at the hearing on January 24,2011, Defendants'

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED this 27th day of January, 2011.

E~

ABETH E. LONG, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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